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STATE TAXATION OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION
ENGAGED IN EXCLUSIVELY INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Minnesota v. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
250 Minn. 32, 84 N.W. 2d 373 (1957)
Probable Jurisdiction Noted, 355 U. S. 911 (No. 606) (1958)
This case places squarely before the United States Supreme Court a
question frequently discussed in dicta and the subject of extensive com-
mentary by constitutional law scholars: Can a state levy a net income
tax upon a foreign corporation carrying on exclusively interstate com-
merce within the taxing state if the tax in question is nondiscriminatory
and reasonably allocated to that portion of the corporation's income
arising out of the taxing state?
The defendant cement manufacturer is an Iowa corporation with
its principal place of business at Mason City, Iowa. Although it had
conducted extensive sales campaigns in Minnesota over a 30-year period,
defendant had never qualified as a foreign corporation in that state.
In accordance with section 290.03, Minnesota Statutes Annotated,1 the
state tax commissioner requested defendant to prepare tax returns for
the period 1933-1948; when defendant refused to do so, the com-
missioner prepared the returns on the basis of inforniation available to
him, utilizing a three-factor formula to determine the proportion of
defendant's net income allocable to business conducted within Minne-
I The portions of M.S.A. §290.03 pertinent to this case are as follows: "An
annual tax for each taxable year, computed in the manner and at the rates
hereinafter provided, is hereby imposed upon the taxable net income for such year
of the following classes of taxpayers:
"(1) Domestic and foreign corporations not taxable under section 290.02
which own property within this state or whose business within this state during
the taxable year consists exclusively of foreign commerce, interstate commerce, or
both;
"Business within the state shall not be deemed to include transportation in
interstate or foreign commerce, or both, by means of ships navigating within or
through waters which are made international for navigation purposes by any
treaty or agreement to which the United States is a party; . . ."
To view the Minnesota taxing structure as a whole, M.S.A. §290.03 must
be read in conjunction with M.S.A. §290.02, which follows: "An annual tax is
hereby imposed upon every domestic corporation, except those included within
section 290.03, for the privilege of existing as a corporation during any part of
its taxable year, and upon every foreign corporation, except those included within
section 290.03, for the grant to it of the privilege of transacting or for the actual
transaction by it of any local business within this state during any part of its
taxable year, in corporate or organized form.
"The tax so imposed shall be measured by such corporations' taxable net
income for the taxable year for which the tax is imposed, and computed in the
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
sota.2 In the district court judgment was given the state; appeal to
the Minnesota supreme court resulted in affirmance, two of the court's
seven justices dissenting. The United States Supreme Court has granted
review of the defendant's two principal contentions 3 that the statute
in question is in conflict with, and consequently void under, the Com-
merce and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution.
The defendant corporation had used Minnesota as an outlet for
some 48 per cent of its sales, employing five salesmen to contact potential
customers there and to urge them to buy cement through defendant's
established Minnesota. outlets, maintaining a sales office at Minneapolis
with a full-time secretary, and allowing one salesman to hold himself
out as district manager. Nonetheless the Minnesota operation remained
entirely under the control of defendant's home office: all employees
were hired at Mason City; all sales were subject to approval there
and all shipments were F.O.B. Mason City; salesmen's automobiles,
all office equipment and supplies except postage stamps were requisitioned
through the home office; salary payments were made 'by Mason City
and expense allowances were processed there. The Minnesota court
made no attempt to find any "intrastate" commerce conducted by defend-
ant in Minnesota.
Defendant's due process objection to the taxing statute presents a
lesser problem than does his second contention. "So far as due process
is concerned the only question is whether the tax in practical operation
has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded
by the taxing state. . . .Those requirements are satisfied if the tax is
fairly apportioned to the commerce carried on within the state." 4 The
obvious benefits accruing to the defendant from the state where it sold
48 per cent of its product would seem clearly to satisfy the basic
relational requirement; ample precedent abounds in sustaining state
power to tax in the circumstances presented by Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Grosjean,5 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.,' and Genera
Trading Co. v. Tax Commissioner.' Defendant raises no question con-
manner and at the rates provided in this chapter."
The statutes are the same except for internal labeling: that covering domestic
corporations and foreign corporations qualified to do business in Minnesota is
called a "privilege" tax while that applicable to non-qualified foreign corporations
carefully avoids any such reference. The tax falls with equal weight upon all
corporations transacting business in Minnesota and is upon that portion of net
income allocated to such business without distinction as to "intrastate" or "inter-
state."
2The defendant attacks neither the accuracy of the commissioner's report
nor the fairness of the apportionment formula employed.
326 U.S.L. WEEK 3197 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1958) (Case No. 606).
40tt v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
5 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
6 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
7 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
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cerning the fairness of the apportionment. There is here present none
of the vice of extraterritoriality which has condemned state taxation
8
and regulation9 of property held or activity occuring beyond the juris-
diction.
The commerce clause issue in this case serves to highlight the
conflict which has troubled the United States Supreme Court for the
past 20 years - the setting of outer limits upon state taxation of inter-
state commerce. The conflict is sharply illustrated in Spector Motor
Service v. O'Connor,"0 the most recent Supreme Court case in this area.
The Connecticut statute in Spector imposed a nondiscriminatory, reason-
ably apportioned tax upon net income derived from commerce within
the state, including exclusively interstate commerce carried on by a
foreign corporation. Spector was a Missouri trucking corporation, author-
ized by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the state public
utilities commission to engage in interstate trucking into and out of
Connecticut. It maintained two terminals there, employed 27 persons
within the state, used in its terminal operations numerous pickup trucks
registered in Connecticut. The state supreme court had described the
Connecticut tax as "a tax or excise upon the franchise of corporations
for the privilege of carrying on or doing business in the state, whether
they be domestic or foreign."'" Adopting the state court's view as to
the nature of the tax, the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down the statute as violative of the Commerce Clause, but not without
three dissents.
The fundamental dichotomy of approach within the Court to the
problem posed by Spector is brought home by comparing the language
of the majority and dissenting opinions. The essence of the prevailing
view is found in these words of Mr. Justice Burton:
This court heretofore has struck down, under the Com-
merce Clause, state taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a
business that was exclusively interstate in character. The con-
stitutional infirmity of such a tax persists no matter how fairly
it is apportioned to business done within the state.' 2
In this field there is not only reason but long-established
precedent for keeping the federal privilege of carrying on
exclusively interstate commerce free from state taxation. To
do so gives lateral support to one of the cornerstones of our
constitutional law-M'Culloch v. Maryland (US) 4 WVheat.
316, 4 L ed 579, supra. 3
STreichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949), reaffirming the rule that land
and taxable personalty are taxable only by the state of situs.
9 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
1040 U.S. 602 (1951); see 13 OHIo ST. L.J. 280 (1952).
11 135 Conn. 37, at 56, 57 (1950).
12 Emphasis original; 340 U.S. 602, at 609.
13 Id. at 610.
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In contrast, Mr. Justice Clark reasoned for Spector's three dissenters
that:
... the Connecticut tax meets every practical test of fairness
and propriety enunciated in cases upholding privilege taxes on
corporations doing a mixed interstate and intrastate business.
These cases should govern here, for there is no apparent
difference between an "exclusively interstate" business and a
"mixed" business which would warrant different constitutional
regard. There is nothing spiritual about interstate commerce.
It is rarely devoid of significant contact with the several
states.
14
The opposing views expressed in Spector characterize the larger
conflict occupying the Court in interstate commerce taxation questions.
The majority reads into the commerce clause the strongest possible
negative implications and zealously guards "exclusively" interstate com-
merce from any privilege tax, relying upon Cheney Brothers Co. v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts5 and Alpha Portland Cement Co.
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 0 It fails to recognize any incon-
sistency in sustaining an apportioned, nondiscriminatory net income tax
upon the privilege of doing business when a taxpayer carries on both
interstate and intrastate activities within the taxing state. 7 Exclusively
interstate commerce remains sacrosanct. Clark and the other dissenters
rely instead on the philosophy underlying the cases laying out Justice
Stone's "multiple burdens doctrine,"" to wit: that the economic effect
of the tax in question and the absence of "cumulative burdens not
imposed on local commerce"' 9 determine whether the tax shall be
allowed to stand. This philosophy seems carried to its logical limits in
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler:2
• . .even if taxpayer's business were wholly interstate com-
merce, a nondiscriminatory tax by Tennessee upon the net
income of a foreign corporation having a commercial domicile
there . . . or upon net income derived from within the state
... is not prohibited by the commerce clause upon which alone
the taxpayer relies. 2'
14 Id. at 612, 613.
15246 U.S. 147 (1917).
16 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
17 Cheney Brothers Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 15.
18 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); J. D.
Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) ; Gwin, White & Prince
v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
19 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 18.
20 315 U.S. 649 (1942).
21 The majority in Spector specifically distinguished this excerpt as dictum
and pointed out that the gas company was found by the state court to be a "profit-
sharing joint adventurer" and not a mere seller of an interstate product. In other
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The Stone doctrine, called by one author a "test of substance," 22
remained the dominant philosophy of the Court for but a -brief span,
beginning with Western Live Stock2 3 in 1938 and continuing no later
than Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Stone24 in 1949 when it could gather
but four members of the Court to the fold.
2 5
Further extension of the doctrine met the vigorous opposition of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, chief dissenter in Interstate Oil and author of
Freeman v. Hewt.2 6 The latter case and Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
Stevedoring Co.27 reiterate the ancient doctrine that states are impotent
to tax interstate commerce. Though never overruling the cases developing
the "multiple burdens doctrine," Justice Frankfurter and his fellow
interstate commerce protectionists have indicated clearly that they intend
the doctrine to go no further.
Reading Spector in this context of intra-Court conflict, it appears
clear that the Minnesota court has rejected both the philosophy and the
precedents that motivated Spector's majority. It is possible that the
Supreme Court will accept the feature which the Minnesota court
selected to distinguish Spector-i.e., the absence of a "privilege" label
in the applicable Minnesota statute. 28 The practical effect of the Supreme
Court's acceptance of this technical distinction would be to limit Spector's
holding so sharply as to adopt the Stone doctrine except in those cases
in which a state legislature carelessly used the wrong label. Other
arguments presented by the state court are not determinative here. That
the tax is upon net income and hence an indirect burden upon interstate
commerce has been determinative only where the tax was upon a
corporation domiciled in the taxing jurisdiction2 9 or doing both interstate
and intrastate business there.30 That the tax does not discriminate against
words there was interstate activity upon which to base the tax upheld there.
22 See Menard, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: From Form to Sub-
stance and Back Again, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 9 (1957).
23 Supra, note 16.
24 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
25 Justice Rutledge, speaking for four of the court in Interstate Oil: "Since
all the activities upon which the tax is imposed are carried on in Mississippi,
there is no due process objection to the tax. The tax does not discriminate against
interstate commerce in favor of competing intrastate commerce of like character.
The nature of the subject of taxation makes apportionment unnecessary; there is
no attempt to tax interstate activity carried on outside Mississippi's borders. No
other state can repeat the tax. For these reasons the commerce clause does not
invalidate the tax." Justice Burton concurred separately solely upon the basis
that the commerce in question was intrastate not interstate.
20 329 U.S. 429 (1946).
27 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
2sSupra, note 1.
29 United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321.
30 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113.
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interstate commerce is merely the first test to be satisfied before sustaining
any tax.
3 1
However, the Court that will hear the appeal from the Minnesota
judgment is not the Court that decided Spector seven years ago. Although
one Federal court foreswore "Gallup-polling" 3 2 the Supreme Court
while Spector was winding its weary way through Connecticut and
Federal courts, the temptation to do so is strong under the present
circumstances. Of six justices voting with the majority then, only Justice
Burton and Justice Frankfurter remain. The three dissenting justices
-Clark, Douglas and Black-continue with the result that a mere even
split among the Court's four new members will be sufficient to revive
the Stone philosophy.
Until Congress sees fit to exercise its power to regulate taxation of
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court - at best a poor agency to
weigh conflicting state and national interests when only the facts of an
individual case are before it - would appear to have more success in
weighing the actual economic factors in the case rather than to adhere
to a policy of label-finding. Striking down only those statutes which
discriminate in fact or make possible multiple burdens should prove
sufficient protection for interstate commerce.
Marshall H. Cox, Jr
31 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
32 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1951).
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